Discover Our Collections


  • Subject > Vietnam (remove)
  • Specific Item Type > Meeting notes (remove)

19 results

  • accepts that. Martin went before the House today. Our area of worry is their general underlying lack of sympathy with us . Martin said he would be disturbed if Canadians thought they had been used. They may cha rge we put them in a false position
  • to ascertain through President Chiari's Press Secretary that President Chiarj_ would receive the telephone call. t I r I B) Mr. Mann wonlct head a delegation representing President JohnGon to leave for Panama immediately, include Messrs. Vance, Martin
  • AMMAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557 STATE GRNC BT -S E e ft E T AMM.AN 3270 NOD IS FEB 3, 1968 8 :14 ;p .M. , FOR YOUR INFORMATION . SUBJECT: ACTIONS NEEDED FORESTALL FURTHER JORDANIAN MOVES TOWARD SOVIETS \ t. AFTER SENDING KING'S MESSAGE
  • some arms deal with Jordan and do so before they decide to go to the Russians. We could agree not to give them supersonics now but review the decision again if they insist. Assis tant Secretary Talbot: Our reply to Jordanian King Hussein has
  • directed George Christian and myself to prepare my notes on the report of the Vietnam election observers and have this distributed to the Members of the Cabinet. Rusk pointed out that the Senators who attended the King Constantine lunch leaked to the press
  • the possibility of bringing Ambassador Bunker to Camp David tomorrow. The two Secretaries thought this would be a good idea. Neither felt the President should attend the King funeral. The President said Bunker's big job is going to be to work
  • , and time was very short. That same evening the Mission flew to Athens and held its first meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Pipinellis and subsequently with King Constantine and Prime Minister Kollias. We found the Greek Government anxious to maintain
  • George Bundy said that King Hussein is prepared to do that, and that his position is unique in that regard. The President wanted to know who the nominee of the group was to under­ take this role as mediator. Bundy recommended the U.S. because "Israel
  • acres . No promises were made as to what we would do to help Indonesia. Suharto is an honest, hard- wo r king man who benefit ed from his training at Fort Leavenworth. Many ot he r Indones i an m ilitary leaders are now showing the g reat benefit
  • In addition, Eisenhower said that Churchill wanted to go into battle. Eisen­ hower told Churchill he did not L"iink it was wise to go into battle because of the additional security that must be provided. When Churchill told the King, the King also said He
  • at 7:15 p.m. Attachment. CETFR.'.lJ.';rn r::i riE ••, AOMINISTR.HiVE t.1~;,KING• c.,__ix.,H ~VICE SET 0 ,., I ).--.JJ.. h'I Meeting began: 6 :02 p. m. Meeting ended: 7:15 p. m. -ft:JP SECRE I NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING -i"'1'1M\1'"if[t
  • zed but have no interes t in the control of conventional a r ms . Our immediat e p r obl em is to gi ve King Hassan a sense of stability. Therefore , we have r ecommended a $14 million a rms sale and a new food ag reement. In this p r ocess , however
  • believes there is a good chance of doing that in the next 5 days. The President asked how many targets had been approved to get behind us before September. McNamara said 7 have been approved and he is as king for 3 additional {shown on the map
  • j udgment. As of this morning, the chances looked pretty good that the former coalition will continue in power . The King may be successful in holding together the coalition gover:iment within the general Geneva framework. Souvanna Phouma, who l as t
  • which Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has cleared. Goldberg thinks the King of Jordan will accept it this afternoon. The President related that he had met with representatives of Colhmbia Broadcasting System yesterday. One of the men asked him
  • oi. ilic U.S.-i?:-.n:.:.-.:4 join; cici;;;;.:;;.~.::,:. .:.: A;>ril 3. · [5r6J Aug. r5 Public Papers of tlu: Presidents Codd you hcip us out on that? Tirn n z smE);T. The administration strongly favors the King-Anderson bill. No one s?caki:ig
  • a neutral government in Laos or whether it would develop into a formal partition. It was agreed that the assistance of the King should be sought but that no great hopes could rest upon him, and that one of the critical ~igures was Kong Le. 7. Mr. Bundy
  • would consider our a c tion as a deliberate provocation during Kosygin lid: visit o I pointed out that it l\."aS not we that had taken the first action and on the contrary we had taken steps to avoid this develop ment.. All we are a.s king